open access publication

Article, 2024

Pieces of the puzzle? Coalition formation and tangential preferences

WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, ISSN 0140-2382, 0140-2382, Volume 47, 1, Pages 61-87, 10.1080/01402382.2023.2234236

Contributors

Dumont, Patrick 0000-0001-6124-8833 (Corresponding author) [1] Falco-Gimeno, Albert 0000-0003-4949-0760 [2] Indridason, Indridi H. 0000-0003-4117-160X [3] [4] Bischof, Daniel 0000-0001-9400-1001 [5]

Affiliations

  1. [1] Australian Natl Univ, Sch Polit & Int Relat, Canberra, Australia
  2. [NORA names: Australia; Oceania; OECD];
  3. [2] Univ Barcelona, Dept Polit Sci, Barcelona, Spain
  4. [NORA names: Spain; Europe, EU; OECD];
  5. [3] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Polit Sci, Riverside, CA USA
  6. [NORA names: United States; America, North; OECD];
  7. [4] Univ Calif Riverside, Dept Polit Sci, Riverside, CA USA
  8. [NORA names: United States; America, North; OECD];
  9. [5] Aarhus Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Aarhus, Denmark
  10. [NORA names: AU Aarhus University; University; Denmark; Europe, EU; Nordic; OECD]

Abstract

The similarity of parties' policy preferences has long been considered an important determinant of whether they form a government coalition. That similarity has typically been assessed based on parties' respective locations in a policy space. The degree to which parties care about different issues may, however, also vary. Parties that care about different issues may actually be the most compatible partners, as their tangential preferences would allow them to engage in policy logrolling and enable them to preserve their distinctiveness in the eyes of voters. This analysis tests arguments regarding the role of tangentiality and its interaction with policy proximity on the party composition of governments formed in Western Europe from 1945 to 2019. The findings show that parties that emphasise the same issues are more natural coalition partners provided the ideological differences between the parties are sufficiently similar.

Keywords

Coalition formation, Western Europe, coalition government, parliamentary democracies, preference compatibility

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